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Communication in Games of Incomplete
Information: The Two-player Case
R. Vijay Krishna∗†
September, 2004
Abstract
We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete infor-
mation. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a
Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with prob-
ability 1.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel [6], it has been well understood that com-
munication in games of incomplete information can expand the set of equilibrium out-
comes that can be achieved and provide the players with Pareto improving outcomes. In
this paper, we examine the question of how much the set of equilibrium outcomes can be
expanded via cheap communication procedures in two-person games of incomplete infor-
mation.
The question is obviously moot if the players can write enforceable contracts wherein
they report their private information to each other and subsequently take an action. We
will refer to such situations as consisting of perfect commitment. The set of such contracts
exhaust all the achievable outcomes. But inmany economic situations of interest, there is no
∗This paper is based on chapter 3 of my doctoral dissertation at The Pennsylvania State University. I
would like to thank my thesis advisors Profs. Kalyan Chatterjee and Tomas Sjo¨stro¨m for their support and
discussions on, among other things, noisy mechanisms, Prof. Franc¸oise Forges for very detailed comments
and Prof. James Jordan for some extremely helpful conversations. All errors that remain are my own.
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commitment at all—players have unverifiable private information, there is no enforcement
agency to which the players can appeal and they cannot commit to any course of action.
Indeed, the Crawford-Sobel results are of such interest precisely because even though the
players cannot commit to telling the truth, there is some sharing of information between a
Sender (who has the private information) and a Receiver (who takes the only payoff relevant
action).
In Bayesian games (i.e. games of incomplete information) there is another construct
which is extremely useful. This is the notion of the mediated communication mechanism.
The idea is that there is a disinterested party, known as the mediator to whom the players
report their private information and the mediator thenmakes private, incentive compatible
recommendations. It can be shown (see Myerson [16]) that even in instances where there
is no commitment, the set of incentive compatible mediated solutions is exactly the same
as the set of incentive compatible enforceable contracts in the case of perfect commitment.
This is because although the players cannot commit, it is the disinterested mediator who
makes the recommendations and his being disinterested guarantees that the players trust
him. The players make honest reports to the mediator because they trust him to make
recommendations according to the mediation plan. They then follow his recommendations
because it is incentive compatible to do so. Following Myerson (pp. 261-262 in Chapter 6
of [16]), we say that “. . . incentive-compatible mediation plans [mediation communication
mechanisms] are the appropriate generalisation of the concept of correlated equilibria in
Bayesian games with communication.”
Of course, this still leaves unresolved the case where there is no commitment and no dis-
interested mediator. In finite games of one-sided incomplete information, it is well known
that extended cheap talk can increase the set of equilibrium outcomes. It is also known
that the more general conversations that can be considered are conversations without an
exogenous deadline. Indeed, there is an example (due to Simon [17]) of a game where fi-
nite conversations of any length do not transmit any information and they neither increase
the set of equilibrium outcomes nor improve on the babbling outcome. But unbounded
conversations produces outcomes that are Pareto superior for both types of the player with
the private information and the uninformed player.
It is known that in finite games of incomplete information with three or more players,
there is a communication mechanism which implements any rational mediated outcome.
In other words, the players can talk amongst themselves and achieve any outcome achiev-
able in the presence of a mediator or if there was perfect commitment. A distinguishing
feature of this mechanism is that it satisfies three important desiderata:
C1 The equilibria from the communication game induced by the protocol be
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perfect Bayesian;
C2 The communication be cheap, non-binding and non-verifiable and
C3 The mechanism be unmediated.
Before we discuss our desiderata, we shall briefly discuss the meaning of the terms used
above. By cheap communication, we mean that the communication itself is costless. By
non-binding, we mean that by taking part in the mechanism, the players do not lose any
strategic options that were available to them as part of the original Bayesian game. By non-
verifiability, wemean that there can be no verification in the future of anything that was said
in the past. In particular, there is no verifiability of past events. (Note that this strongly re-
sembles our intuitive idea of what constitutes “talk.”) Of course, the first requirement seems
natural as we would not like our outcomes to depend on incredible threats. Hence, require-
ments C1 and C2 can be said to constitute a robust mechanism that represents our intuitive
idea of cheap talk. But requirements C1 and C2 are not enough. These are satisfied by
mediated communication mechanisms. Indeed, in mediated communication mechanisms,
there is no cost to communicating with the mediator and the players still retain all of their
strategic options when they are about to take an action. Thus, requirement C3 is crucial,
that there be no other player.
Unfortunately, there is no protocol that satisfies the above three requirements in the two
player case. This is made precise below. (The reader will find all the relevant definitions in
§3.)
Theorem 0. There exists a Bayesian game and a mediated communication mechanism which
satisfies a Nash domination condition such that there is no communication mechanism satis-
fying requirements C1-C3 above which can approximate the mediated communication mech-
anism outcome.
Remark. It should be mentioned that in the sequel, we shall take all communication mech-
anisms to be of order type ω. For more on the so-called transfinite conversations, the reader
is referred to Krishna [12].
Proof. We will demonstrate an example of a generic game with the property that no com-
munication of denumerable length will simulate the presence of a mediator. Indeed, in
doing so, we will also not insist on requirement C1. It will suffice to provide a Sender-
Receiver game as an example. (Recall that a Sender-Receiver game is a game where the
Sender has some private information and the Receiver takes the only payoff relevant ac-
tion.) By Theorem A of Aumann and Hart [1], any communication in a Sender-Receiver
game can be thought of as a canonical conversation, where a canonical conversation is a
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conversation where in odd periods, the Sender sends a signal which could potentially give
the Receiver some information about the Sender’s type and in even periods, the players
compromise about future courses of action via joint lotteries. But now consider the exam-
ple of Forges [7] who gives an example of a Sender-Receiver game where the set of mediated
communication mechanism outcomes is strictly larger than the set of outcomes from un-
bounded canonical conversations (i.e. conversations that have denumerable length). She
also demonstrates the existence of a mediated communication mechanism outcome which
cannot be approximated by unmediated cheap talk.
As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 0, we do not get very far by relaxing requirement
C1. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, we can do much better if we relax requirement C2.
In our Main Theorem below, we show that any rational mediated communication mech-
anism outcome (see the definition in §3) that that satisfies a Nash domination condition
can be implemented via cheap communication mechanism that satisfies requirements C1
and C3. We are not stipulating that there somehow be any sort of commitment—all we are
asking is that in the extensive form game which represents an instance of the mechanism,
the players be allowed, on occasion, to verify their coordinates in the game-tree. (This will
be made clear below, via an example in §4.)
From the point of view of applications, this raises some very interesting questions. It has
long been thought that the lack of commitment in an economic environment poses some
very real problems by reducing the set of achievable outcomes. But we have shown that
this is just because all the possible communication mechanisms have not been explored. It
should be emphasised that there is no enforcement of any kind and the players’ participa-
tion in the protocol (which induces the extended game) is completely voluntary. They do
not have to take part in the protocol, but do so because it is in their best interests to do so.
This demonstrates that the problem of lack of commitment can be greatly ameliorated with
communication and more so with increasingly sophisticated communication mechanisms.
In fact, one could view our result as the culmination of what can be done without a
mediator or equivalently, when there is no commitment. We show that given sufficient
latitude in the choice of mechanism, there is no loss of efficiency at all. This implies that
in any application where there is limited commitment, the choice of mechanism is not a
benign choice. Indeed, we believe it is incumbent on the modeller to explain his choice of
mechanism. For instance, consider Bester and Strausz [5] who study the case of limited
commitment in principal agent problems. They characterise the incentive efficient equilib-
ria with one round of signalling from the agent. But why should this be the appropriate
mechanism to consider? Why not consider multiple rounds of cheap talk or infinitely many
rounds of cheap talk, or a more sophisticated mechanism (such as the one we introduce in
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§§4 and 5)? We believe that these are important questions that the modeller should not shy
away from.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In §2 we describe the related liter-
ature and how it relates to the present paper. In §3 we introduce the model, all the relevant
definitions and our Main Theorem. In §5 we provide a proof of the Main Theorem. We
conclude with a brief discussion in §6.
2 Related Literature
The usefulness of cheap-talk in Bayesian games was first pointed out by Crawford and So-
bel [6]. The idea of mediated solutions is discussed in great detail in Chapter 6 of Myerson
[16]. A version of the mediated solution in extensive form games is described by Myerson
in [15]. In Chapter 6 of [16], Myerson shows that noisy mechanisms (a precise definition is
provided in §6) can help agents achieve outcomes that are otherwise not attainable. He also
alludes to an equivalence between noisy communication mechanisms in complete informa-
tion games and noisy mechanisms in Sender-Receiver (and incomplete information) games.
Although there are no theorems to this effect, the ideas presented therein have turned out
to be immensely valuable. It is this equivalence which enables us to prove our Main The-
orem in §5. We adapt a mechanism due to Ben-Porath [3] which uses urns and balls to
implement correlated equilibria in a large class of bi-matrix games of perfect information
to our environment. In the context of equivalence of noisy mechanisms in games of in-
complete information and games of perfect information, we should mention a recent paper
by Urbano and Vila [18] where it is shown that if the players have bounded computational
capabilities, they can achieve any correlated equilibrium in bi-matrix games. Their result is
based on the fact that certain algebraic operations (exponentiation and taking logarithms)
in prime fields are extremely hard to compute.
Barany [2] studies how a communication protocol can implement rational correlated
equilibria in games of complete information. He shows that if there are at least four players,
then any rational correlated equilibrium can be implemented via a communication proto-
col. Forges [8] extends this study to Bayesian games. She shows that when there are at least
four players, every ex-ante mediated outcome can be implemented as a correlated equilib-
rium of a cheap talk extension of the original game. Now using the result of Barany, it is
straightforward to show that every rational mediated outcome can be implemented as a
Nash equilibrium. Here, ex-ante means that all the communication occurs before the play-
ers learn their types. Gerardi [10] extends this result to the standard interim case, where
players communicate after learning their types. Unfortunately, none of these results use
procedures that are sequentially rational.
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The problem of sequential rationality is addressed by Ben-Porath [4] who also requires
only three players. He shows that in any Bayesian game with at least three players, any
rational mediated outcome satisfying certain individual rationality constraints can be im-
plemented via a communication protocol which satisfies requirements (1) and (2) above
and ends in finite time. (Requirements (1) and (2) were, in fact, adapted from [4].)
We should also mention a result due to Lehrer and Sorin [13]. They point out that in
general, mediated communication mechanisms need not be stochastic. They introduce a
deterministic mediated mechanism which can implement any rational mediated mediated
communication mechanism (which, in general, is not deterministic). Their result applies
to both complete information games (wherein they implement correlated equilibria and
Bayesian games. It should be noted that the mechanism we use in our example and in the
proof of our Main Theorem in §§4 and 5 respectively, seems as much a descendant of the
Lehrer-Sorin mechanism as of the Ben-Porath mechanism.
There is also a literature which studies outcomes from pure cheap talk alone (i.e. com-
munication which satisfies our requirement (2)) in two-player games. The main paper in
this area is Aumann and Hart [1] who characterise the set of all Nash equilibrium out-
comes from pure cheap talk with unbounded conversations in two-person Bayesian games
with one-sided incomplete information. The example in Forges [7] is based on this theory.
Krishna [12] studies a special class of such games, namely the so-called Sender-Receiver
games. He shows that if a Sender-Receiver game satisfies a certain condition, then, among
other things, the set of equilibria from unbounded conversations is the same as the set of
equilibria from conversations that are almost surely finite.
Pure cheap talk is used in a variety of applications and we shall only mention two in-
stances. Prime among these is the Crawford-Sobel model. It and it’s variants have been the
workhorse in a large number of political economy models (see [11]). Another example of
cheap talk at work is Matthews and Postlewaite [14], who show that with preplay commu-
nication in a standard k-double auction, the set of equilibrium outcomes is independent of
the parameter k.
3 TheModel andMain Result
A game of incomplete information (which we shall also refer to as a Bayesian game) is char-
acterised by Γ b := (N, (Ci)i∈N , (Ti)i∈N , P, (ui)i∈N), whereN is the set of players and for each
player i ∈ N, the set of possible actions is Ci, the set of possible types is Ti, P is a proba-
bility measure on T and i’s utility is given by ui. If we let C := ×iCi and T := ×iTi, then
ui : C× T → R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. We say that Γ
b is finite iff
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N is finite and Ci and Ti are finite for each i ∈ N. (We will mainly be interested in the case
where N = 2.)
Each player i first learns his own type and then forms beliefs over the types of the other
players. His belief over the types of the other players is denoted by pi : Ti → ∆(T−i) where
∆(T
i
) is the set of probability distributions over T−i and is calculated via Baye’s rule so that
pi(t−i|ti) :=
P(t)∑
s
−i∈T−i
P(s−i, ti)
.
Thus, we can also say that beliefs are consistent since all the conditional beliefs pi can be
derived from a single probability measure P. Player i’s strategy σi is a function σi : Ti →
∆(Ci). A profile of strategies σ := (σi)i∈N is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each player
i, given his type ti ∈ Ti, σi(ti) maximises his expected utility given his information and the
other players’ strategies. In other words,
∑
t
−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)ui(σi(ti), σ−i(t−i), t) >
∑
t
−i∈T−i
p(t−i|ti)ui(σ˜i(ti), σ−i(t−i), t)
for all strategies σ˜i ∈ ∆(Ci)
Ti .1
Now suppose there is a disinterested mediator2 with whom the players can communi-
cate. This gives us a Bayesian game with communication wherein the players communicate
after they learn their types but before they choose an action. Let each player report his type
confidentially to the mediator. The mediator, upon receiving messages from all the players,
makes private probabilistic recommendations of actions to take to each player. Specifically,
player i sends a message mi ∈ Ti to the mediator. Then the mediator makes a recommen-
dation according to µ : T → ∆(C). Thus, a strategy for player i is a pair (mi, δi) where
mi is the type report that player i sends to the mediator and δi : Ci → ∆(Ci) is such that
player i, upon receiving the recommendation ci, takes the action δi(ci). We will require that∑
c˜∈C µ(c˜|t) = 1 and µ(c|t) > 0 for all c ∈ C and t ∈ T. Indeed, any such function
µ : T → ∆(C) will be referred to as amediated communication mechanism. Recall that such
a mechanism still satisfies C1 and C2. We shall call a mediated communication mechanism
rational if µ(c|t) is rational for each c ∈ C and for every t ∈ T.
Let us consider the instance where each player reports his type honestly to the mediator
and obeys the recommendation of the mediator. Then, player i’s expected utility from the
mediation mechanism µ is
Ui(µ|t) :=
∑
t
−i∈T−i
∑
c∈C
pi(t−i|ti)µ(c|t)ui(c, t).
1If X and Y are sets, YX denotes the set of all mappings from X to Y .
2The discussion on mediated mechanisms is based on Chapter 6 of Myerson [16].
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That we can restrict attention to truth-telling strategies in the reporting stage is because of
the Revelation Principle (see, for instance, [16]). The mediation plan µ therefore induces a
communication game Γ b
µ
wherein each player first chooses a reporting strategy mi (which
depends on his type alone) and a choice of action δi(ci) upon receipt of the recommendation
ci. Thus a strategy is a pair (mi, δi). The type sets are the same as in Γ
b and the utility
functions in Γ b
µ
are derived in the obvious way. Now if player i were to use strategy (mi, δi),
his expected utility from the mechanism µ is given by
Ui(µ, δi,mi|ti) :=
∑
t
−i∈T−i
∑
c∈C
pi(t−i|ti)µ(c|t−i,mi)ui(c−i, δi(ci), t)
if all the other players remain honest and obedient. We will say that a mediated communi-
cation mechanism µ is incentive compatible iff being honest while reporting their type to the
mediator and obedient while following the recommendation of the mediator is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the game with communication. Thus, µ is incentive compatible if, for
all i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, mi ∈ Ti (the report of player i) and δi ∈ ∆(Ci)
Ci (the choice of action for
player i when the recommendation is ci), it is the case that
Ui(µ|t) > Ui(µ, δi,mi|ti).
The mediator represents, in an indirect way, commitment among the players. Although
they cannot write binding contracts to reveal their information and act according to the
resulting prescription (possibly because the information is not verifiable and there is no
enforcement mechanism), they can nonetheless achieve the same outcomes through a me-
diator. Thus, the set of incentive compatible mechanisms represents all the outcomes that
could potentially be realised as the equilibrium of any other mechanism or protocol.
Recall that an outcome function is a function ψ : T → ∆(C). (Then ψ(t) is a prob-
ability measure on C and ψ(t)(c) is the probability of the outcome being c.) Consider
now any other cheap communication extension of Γ b represented by Γ bc . Here, Γ
b
c is an
extensive form game where players communicate after learning their types. At some en-
dogenously determined point in time, the players simultaneously choose their actions from
the original game Γ b. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈N in Γ
b
c induces an outcome function
ψσ : T → ∆(C). We will say that an outcome function ψ can be implemented via a com-
munication mechanism if there exists a cheap communication extension Γ bc and a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium σ which induces ψ. We will therefore call ψ (following Ben-Porath
[4]) a communication equilibrium outcome if for all i ∈ N, ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti and δ ∈ ∆(Ci)
Ci , it is
the case that
∑
t
−i∈T−i
∑
c∈C
p(t−i|ti)ψ(t)(c)ui(c, t) >
∑
t
−i∈T−i
∑
c∈C
p(t−i|ti)ψ(t
′
i , t−i)ui(δ(ci), c−i, (ti, t−i)).
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The right hand side of the equation above represent the two kinds of deviations that any
player could have, namely by pretending to be another type t′i or by choosing an action
according to δi(ci) instead of choosing ci.
As mentioned above, the set ofmediated communicationmechanism outcomes encom-
passes everything that is achievable as the equilibrium outcome of some mechanism. We
are interested in implementing these mediated outcomes via communication mechanisms
that are unmediated. In other words, our goal is to find a mechanism so that for any me-
diated communication mechanism outcome, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
game induced by the mechanism that implements the mediated mechanism. Let us intro-
duce some more notation. For any Bayesian game Γ b, let NE(Γ b) be the associated set of
Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoffs to the various players and their type and co(NE(Γ b)) its
convex hull. We need one more definition before we continue.
3.1 Definition. Let Γ b be any Bayesian game. A mediated communication mechanism µ is
Nash dominating for player m if there exists a payoff vector α ∈ co(NE(Γ b)) with the payoff
to type j of player m given by α
j
m such that Um(µ|tj) > α
j
m for all tj ∈ Tm. We shall call the
equilibrium which generates such an outcome Nash dominated for player m.
We are now ready to state our Main Theorem.
Main Theorem. Let Γ b be any Bayesian game with two players and let ψ be an outcome
function that is induced by some mediated communication mechanism µ. Suppose µ is Nash
dominating for player m. Then, there exists a communication mechanism satisfying C1 and
C3 that is cheap and non-binding that implements ψ with probability 1.
Remarks. Note that the only criterion we have dropped is that the communication mech-
anism be non-verifiable. Also note that for the Nash domination condition, we have used
the convex hull of the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of the original game. We will describe
below how this can be achieved.
We will need a few more ideas in order to move towards our end. We will use the idea
of a joint lottery. A joint lottery simulates a public randomising device and works in a
straightforward manner for lotteries of the form (λ, 1− λ) where λ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Consider
the case where there are two players and suppose they wish to pursue a particular course
of action called outcome 1 with (rational) probability λ and some other outcome, 2, with
the complementary probability. To achieve this, we assume that λ = p
q
where p, q ∈ Z+
and are coprime. Now let each player have Zq := Z/qZ = {0, . . . , q − 1} as a message
space. The players simultaneously send messages z1 and z2 respectively to each other from
the message space with each message being drawn according to the uniform distribution.
Then, we will stipulate that outcome 1 obtains if z1 + z2 (mod q) ∈ Zp. Note that z1 + z2
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(mod q) is uniformly distributed over Zq. It is now easy to see that outcome 1 obtains with
probability λ = p
q
and it is also the case that neither player has an incentive to unilaterally
choose the message according to some other distribution (which constitutes a change in
strategy). We will also use the coding tools of envelopes with notes in them and larger
envelopes which contain these envelopes. (These correspond respectively to the balls with
messages in them and the urns containing the balls in Ben-Porath [3]. Our choice of this
alternative terminology stems from æsthetic concerns as we will be using envelopes within
envelopes (which we shall refer to as nested envelopes) and we find the image of urns within
urns somewhat unappealing.)
Now to see how to convexify the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria. For simplicity, con-
sider the case where the players want to generate a convex combination of two equilibria of
the original game. In particular, suppose that they want to implement the first equilibrium
with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] and the second with complementary probability. Achieving this
boils down to conducting a lottery with the respective probabilities. But the procedure de-
scribed above, namely the joint lotteries, only works for rational probabilities. Nevertheless,
a multi-step version of the procedure can be adopted to produce any probability.
Let each player have {a, b} as a message set. With probability 1
2
, the players simultane-
ously send the message a to each other. Then, let the players record the outcome as 0 if they
send each other the same message and 1 if the messages are different. Repeat this procedure
again. After n repetitions, the players will have generated a string of 0’s and 1’s, which can
be written as 0. o1o2 . . . on (where oi ∈ {0, 1}). We will regard this as the binary expansion
of a real number. The players will stop and implement the first outcome if the number they
generate is less than ρ and the second outcome if the number if greater than ρ. Also, they
will stop in finite time a.s. For example, consider the case where ρ = 0. 0101010101 . . . in
base 2. Then, there will be a first digit which does not match the expansion. In particular,
suppose after four rounds of communication, the players generate 0. 0100, they will stop
and play the first outcome. They could not have stopped after three rounds as the first three
digits of the number they generated were the same as the first three digits in the binary
expansion of ρ. But the fourth round told them that the number they were generating was
definitely less than ρ.
This gives us a procedure to create arbitrary convex combinations. The players can now
choose to play different outcomes with different probabilities. In particular, they can also
play any convex combination of the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game.
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4 An Example
We now consider an example that illustrates the workings of our mechanism. Consider the
following game Sender-Receiver from §6.7 of Myerson [16]. The Sender has two types, t1
and t2 with the prior probability of t1 being q ∈ [0, 1]. The Receiver has three possible
actions, namely x, y and z. Consider the case where q = 1
2
.
2,3 0,2 −1, 0
x y z
t1[q]
1,0 2,2 0,3t2[1− q]
Figure 1: Example
We leave it to the reader to verify that with one round of cheap talk (as in Crawford-
Sobel), there is no transmission of information and the only equilibrium is the so-called
babbling equilibrium (also known as the equilibrium of the silent game in the terminology of
Aumann andHart [1]). In this equilibrium, the Sender’s expected payoffs (for the respective
types) is (0,2), while the Receiver gets an expected payoff of 2.
It turns out that any finite number of stages also do not increase the set of equilibrium
outcomes. (For the initiated reader, this is because the graph of equilibrium payoffs of the
silent game as a multi-function over the set of probability distributions over types, which
in this case is [0, 1], is bi-convex.) But there are mediated solutions that provide Pareto
superior payoffs (in expectation) for both the Sender and the Receiver.
Mediated Communication Mechanism. Consider
µ(x|t1) =
2
3
, µ(y|t1) =
1
3
, µ(z|t1) = 0,
µ(x|t2) = 0, µ(y|t2) =
2
3
, µ(z|t2) =
1
3
.
which maximises the Receiver’s payoffs. This gives expected payoffs
US(µ|t1) = 1
1
3
, US(µ|t2) = 1
1
3
, UR(µ) = 2
1
2
.
To see truthful reporting by the Sender, consider when t1 lies. If he reports t2 his payoff is
2
3
× 0 +
1
3
× (−1) < 1
1
3
.
If the Sender is of type t2, then by reporting t1 he gets
2
3
× 1 +
1
3
× 2 = 1
1
3
= Us(µ|t2)
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which is the same payoff as reporting truthfully. Thus, neither type has an incentive to
report untruthfully. Now consider the Receiver’s posterior probabilities upon receiving the
various recommendations. If the Receiver gets the recommendation x, he knows that the
true state of the world is t1 as µ(x|t2) = 0. Conditional on his new posterior, his best action
is the recommended action x. Similarly, for the case when he receives the recommendation
z, his posterior probability assigns probability 1 to state t2 which makes z the optimal action
for him. If he receives y as a recommendation, he assigns probability 2
3
to the state being t2.
But with these posteriors, UR(y|y) = 2 = UR(z|y) > UR(x|y), making the recommended y
an optimal choice. We will now consider a cheap, unmediated communication mechanism
which will implement the above mediated plan.
TheMechanism
Step 1 We shall assume that the players have access to sealable envelopes and pieces of paper
on which they can write messages. Let the Receiver write messages and place each
message in an envelope according to the mediated solution. This means that there are
six envelopes, two of which contain themessage x, three of which contain the message
y and the last one contains the message z. The Receiver then places the envelopes in
larger envelopes according to the type of the Sender. In particular, he takes two large
envelopes and labels them t1 and t2. In the envelope labelled t1, he places the two
envelopes containing x and one containing y. In the envelope labelled t2, he places
all the other envelopes containing messages. Note that this mimics the distribution
which is the mediated solution.
Step 2 We now come to the randommonitoring stage. Our protocol requires the players to
verify the contents of all the envelopes with some probability, ρ (which can be taken to
be rational). This is accomplished by a joint lottery as described in §3. If the outcome
of the lottery requires the verification of the contents of all the envelopes, then this
is performed. If there is a deviation from the equilibrium by the Receiver, then the
Sender decides to babble (which results in a payoff of 2 for the Receiver). If there is
no deviation, then the Receiver repeats Step 1. If however, the outcome of the joint
lottery was that there be no verification, the players move to Step 3.
Step 3 The Receiver then hands the two labelled envelopes to the Sender. The Sender pri-
vately takes a message out of the envelope corresponding to his type and hands it to
the Receiver. The Receiver opens the envelope and takes the prescribed action. All the
other envelopes remain unopened and are destroyed publicly.
We have not yet specified the random monitoring probability, ρ. We shall do so now.
Let αR denote the Receiver’s payoffs from the babbling equilibrium and let W denote the
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maximal payoff available to him in the game. Also, let UR(µ) be his expected payoff from
following the mechanism. (Note that in this case, αR = 2, W = 3 and UR(µ) = 2
1
2
. Thus,
UR(µ) > αR which means that µ is Nash dominating for the Receiver.) If the Receiver
deviates, his payoff is bounded above by
ραR + (1− ρ)W .
As mentioned above, his expected payoff from following the mechanism is UR(µ). He will
not deviate if
UR(µ) > ραR + (1− ρ)W . (1)
But UR(µ) > αR, so there exists a ρ so that (1) is satisfied. We can then take any ρ > ρ such
that ρ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. It is easy to see that the mechanism ends in finite time with probability
1.3 It is also easy to see that the equilibrium constructed is perfect Bayesian. In §5 below,
we show that our mechanism for the Sender-Receiver game is a special case of a general
scheme.
5 Proof of Main Theorem
We shall now provide a generalisation of the protocol described in §4. Let us assume that
the players wish to implement a mediated communication mechanism µ, as described in
§3.
TheMechanism
Step 1 Suppose player 1 is of type ti ∈ T1 and player 2 is of type τj ∈ T2. Player 2 makes
envelopes for this state (t = (ti, τj)) according to µ(t). In particular, suppose µ(c|t) =
1
2
= µ(c′|t) (where c = (c1, c2)). Then player 2 makes two envelopes for state t. In the
first envelope, say the envelope corresponding to the action c, there will be envelopes
marked Player 1 and Player 2. The envelope marked Player 1 will have the action c1
inside on a piece of paper and similarly for the other envelope. To recap, an envelope
for state t has inside it more envelopes containing envelopes withmessages. These are
the nested envelopes referred to in §3.
Now player 2 makes envelopes for all states t ∈ T. But the labels on the envelope for
a particular state are as follows: state t = (ti, τj) will be marked ti,m where m ∈ |T2|
and there is a bijection ξ : T2 → |T2| such that m = ξ(τj). Note that the bijection
ξ ∈ Ξ, the space of all bijections from T2 to |T2|, is chosen by player 2 at random
according to the uniform distribution. Then the players proceed to Step 2.
3The probability that it takes at least n iterations being ρn which becomes small very quickly as n becomes
larger. Also, the protocol runs for an expected time of ρ
(1−ρ)2
.
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Step 2 This is the randommonitoring stage. The players conduct a joint lottery where with
a probability ρ, the contents of all the envelopes are checked. If there is a deviation
by player 2, i.e. if he has not placed the messages in the envelopes and the nested
envelopes according to the mediated solution µ, then they play the Nash dominated
equilibrium for player 2. If there is no deviation, they go back to Step 1. If the joint
lottery does not require them to open all the envelopes, the players proceed to Step 3.
Step 3 Suppose that player 2’s true type is τ1. He then removes all the envelopes corre-
sponding to states t = (ti, τj) where τj 6= τ1 and hands the remaining envelopes to
player 1. In other words, he tells player 1 that he is of typem = ξ(τ1), but since player
1 does not know ξ and all the ξ’s are equally likely, his beliefs about player 2’s type
remain unchanged. Player 1 now picks the envelope corresponding to his type and
picks one of the envelopes in it. This envelope contains the envelopesmarked Player 1
and Player 2. He hands player 2 his envelope and they play the recommended action.
Remark. The reason for player 2 making envelopes corresponding to all states t ∈ T is that
if he just made it for all t = (ti, τj) where τj is his true type and the players are required to
inspect the contents of the envelopes in themonitoring stage, then player 1 can, in principle,
infer the type of player 2.
All that remains to be done is to determine a monitoring probability, ρ. This will be
done as in §4. Recall that α
j
2 is the payoff to type τj of player 2. Now consider the case where
player 2 of type τj deviates. Then, assuming that the maximum payoff in the game isW , his
payoffs are bounded from above by
ρα
j
2 + (1− ρ)W .
But his expected payoff from following the protocol is U2(µ|τj) and we require that
U2(µ|τj) > ρα
j
2 + (1− ρ)W . (2)
But U2(µ|τj) > α
j
2 by assumption, therefore there exists a ρ such that (2) is satisfied and
we can find a ρ > ρ such that ρ ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. We now consider the issue of perfection.
At each zero-probability node at which the players takes an action, their beliefs are exactly
their priors. More precisely, the players’ beliefs about each other’s types are always updated
using Baye’s rule, and since deviations do not provide any information, the priors remain
the same. Given an envelope with a recommendation, player 2 doesn’t update his priors
about the type of player 1 before he takes an action. Any updating to be performed is done
by Baye’s rule and is possible for any allocation of messages in envelopes in the various
bigger envelopes by player 2. Thus, the equilibrium constructed is perfect Bayesian.
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6 Discussion
In this paper, we have discussed the notion of a mediated solution and demonstrated that
any mediated solution which satisfies a Nash domination condition can be implemented
via a cheap communication mechanism. In this section, we will discuss some other ideas
related to that of the mediator before we conclude.
In §§4 and 5, we adapted a mechanism due to Ben-Porath [3]. Our main technique
is to use a menu of nested envelopes to simulate the role of the mediator. The key to a
mediated mechanism is the observation that even upon receipt of the recommendation
from the mediator, the players are unsure of the type of their opponent. This is so even after
the players update their beliefs using Baye’s rule. Thus, the essential role of the mediator
is to move the players’ posterior beliefs about each other’s types around in an incentive
compatible way. This can also be achieved by a noisy communication medium (see, for
instance, chapter 6 of [16]). In other words, we can also think of the mediator as someone
who introduces noise in the communication. Let us consider this more abstractly.
Let M1 and M2 represent the set of messages send to some machine (which could also
be a disinterested third party, the mediator) and let X1 and X2 represent the set of messages
that the players receive. Now define, M := M1 ×M2 and X := X1 × X2. Let (X,X ) be a
measurable space and with a slight abuse of notation, let ∆(X) denote the space of proba-
bility measures on this measurable space. This is the abstract representation of any single
stage communication mechanism where the players send messages and receive randomised
messages after which they take an action. (It is straightforward to extend the definitions
to multi-stage communication mechanisms, but we shall not do so here in the interests of
notational simplicity.) More precisely, we can state the following.
6.1 Definition. A communication mechanism is a tuple (M, (X,X ), ν) where ν : M →
∆(X).
Thus, the signals that the players receive is a random variable drawn according to the
probability measure ν(m) over (X,X ). If we assume that X is a topological space and
X is the corresponding Borel σ-algebra, then the support of a measure P is a closed set
C =: supp(P) such that (i) P(C) = 1 and (ii) P(C′) < 1 for all closed sets C′ ⊂ C. The
support exists if X is a sufficiently nice topological space, an assumption we shall make.
This leads us to the following condition and definition.
Condition T. For all m ∈ M, supp(ν(m)) is a singleton.
6.2 Definition. A communication mechanism is noiseless4 iff it satisfies Condition T. A com-
4Lehrer and Sorin [13] call a noiseless mechanism deterministic. We use this alternative terminology to
emphasise the distinction from noisy mechanisms.
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munication mechanism that is not noiseless will be called noisy.
Remark. It is pertinent to point out Lehrer and Sorin’s result at this stage. They show that
by suitably expandingM1 andM2, any rational mediated solution can be achieved through
a noiseless (deterministic) albeit mediated communication mechanism.
It is instructive to consider the role of the mediator here in the simple case of Sender-
Receiver games, as in §4. Consider a mediatedmechanism µ(·|t). For each type t, the Sender
is promised that the outcome chosen will be drawn according to the probability distribu-
tion µ(·|t). The Sender truthfully reveals his type t to the mediator if he believes that the
outcome will, in fact, be generated by the said probability distribution. The mediator then
make a recommendation to the Receiver by randomising over the elements in supp(µ(·|t))
according to the probability distribution µ(·|t) (with the recommendation being the out-
come of the randomisation). Of course, the Sender has to truthfully reveal his type and the
Receiver has to comply and take the recommended action, but this is what the incentive
compatibility constraints guarantee. Thus, a mediated mechanism is an example of a noisy
communication mechanism.
Another example of a noisy communication mechanism is given by the game in §4
above. Recall that there is no transmission of information even with unbounded cheap
talk. However, Myerson shows that if the Sender has access to pigeons that get lost with
some probability, then there can be some transmission of information. This is possible be-
cause when a pigeon doesn’t arrive, the Receiver is not sure if it was because the Sender did
not send the pigeon or because the pigeon got lost. Note that the message that the Receiver
receives is the arrival of the pigeon and not the message the pigeon may bear. Myerson then
shows that with more general noisy mechanisms (i.e. mediated mechanisms), even more
equilibrium outcomes can be realised as communication equilibria. But a common feature
of all these noisy mechanism is that they provide some degree of protection for the players.
Specifically, in the game in §4, with just signalling, type t1 of the Sender always wants to pre-
tend to be type t2. However, the introduction of a noisy communication channel provides
him with more protection from exposure.
As mentioned before, our mechanism is a descendant of Ben-Porath’s [3]. We modify
his mechanism by allowing for a menu of nested envelopes from which one of the players
chooses. As in [3], the envelopes with messages provide enough uncertainty to simulate
the noise that a mediator brings. The main connection between our mechanism and the
one used by Ben-Porath in [4] is the use of randommonitoring. Otherwise, his mechanism
ends in finite time and has no possibility of verification (as in requirement C2 above). We
believe that with our Theorem 0 and Main Theorem and Ben-Porath’s [4] result, we have a
complete taxonomy of everything that can be achieved through unmediated talk. We also
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hope that our and the aforementioned results will persuade game theoretic modelers to pay
more attention to the reasons for their particular choice of mechanism in their applications.
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